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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between qualia and language. Author will begin with the explanation of the nature of qualia using the negative method (second and third chapter), which will reveal that qualia are neither ontological properties in a traditional sense, viewed as instances of subjective experience, nor that they possess any epistemological value as such. In the fourth chapter, qualia will be confronted with language on the grounds of experience which we understand as holistic. Experience as such is not differential, which means it does not contain subject-object relationship in an ontological sense. Afterwards, phenomenologically analyzed, experience will be shown in two modes: pre-personal and personal. Pre-personal experience as un-reflective cannot produce a subject-object relationship and as such is a birthplace of qualia as a stimuli-response structure. On the other hand, the possibility of personal experience depends only on consciousness. Consciousness is an active function of experience which produces the subject-object relationship by objectifying the relations between itself and the other. Such objectification is only possible within the boundaries of language which is constituted as a relationship of meanings; which is to say that without meaning there is no object at all. The final conclusion of the paper refers to the bridge connection between qualia and language (pre-personal and personal) which is established by consciousness.

### Key words:

experience, language, personal, pre-personal, qualia.

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## Introduction: Language and Privacy

The objective of this paper is to observe the relationship between the language and qualia. We hope that this relation will unravel the possible linguistic side of qualia. However, one might think that we will, eventually, run up against the wall, hitting the dead end. This assumption naturally follows from the well-known characteristics of qualia such as ineffability, privacy, and interiority - which we will examine in the next chapter – and correspondingly the nature of language which

is everything but ineffable and intra-subjective. So, how can something like qualia have a linguistic side? If one fails to report one's *inner-state* – which is deeply private – it seems counter-intuitive to think about that possibility. However, we are here, talking about our impressions every day, sharing them with others.

If I say how wonderful, tasteful and peachy this peach tea is, you will, accordingly, get the idea of what I am talking about, even if you cannot feel the same taste at the time. Now, what is your idea about it, and how can you get it? Well, the only possible way to get the *meaning* of my words and thoughts is through language. In other words, you associate the words of tea, peach, and taste, which evokes the *meaning* of what it is like to feel something through your senses which are intertwined in the given situation or context. Still, if I say, for example, how this peach tea tastes watermallony, something different will arise. There are numerous ways in how this conversation can continue. My interlocutor can suspect the validity of a statement because of the implausible 'watermelon-peach' association; he can also try the tea himself in order to be sure, but then suddenly it does not taste like peach or watermellon but lemon to him.

We can prolong further disagreement, or we can give it a new name – if we feel playful – to this quite flavorful tea 'peach-watermelon-lemon' pea-wat-emon creating the new meaning accepted by both of us, which includes three flavours at once. However, this meaning will not extend further when we call the waiter and ask for two 'pea-wat-emon teas'. Furthermore, the meaning is not gone and evaporated completely, it only reaches its maximum comprehensive distance. Now, if we cut out the second person (my silly friend), we will come to the doorstep of private language and sensations which dwell in our mind states as qualia.

In his work *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein denies the possibility of private language (PI #243– #271). He tackles the problem of designating or naming our private sensations via some kind of fictional private words, which are able to communicate the meaning on their own (PI #256 - #264). On the contrary, the meaning is to be found in the usage of our words; and its validation requires an objective criterion; as Wittgenstein claims, usage is the criterion of understanding (PI #146). We will embrace Wittgenstein's theory of language, as we believe it is impossible to infuse the meaning *ex nihilo*. Language, therefore, should be understood as social construct, a cluster of rules (*language games*). Respectively, similar claim about the social or collective nature of language can be found in the *Course of General Linguistics* by Ferdinand de Saussure: 'Language is not the function of the speaker; it is a product that is passively assimilated by the individual. It never requires premeditation, and reflection enters in only for the purpose of classification...' (Saussure, 1959, p. 14)

As we have shown in the last two paragraphs, the name 'pea-wat-emon' does not mean anything for those around us. It is an instance of private language, which cannot be *used* in our communication with others. The usage of the words, therefore determines its availability. Secondly, our new word relating to the specific taste

lacks the criteria of correctness which cannot be deduced from our own experience (inner and raw mental states). In other words, the new, made-up word lacks a function – it is impotent. Our complex word is composed of words: ‘peach, watermelon, lemon.’<sup>1</sup>This raises the question if we can imagine a completely new word which could denote the new taste never experienced before. Individually, that is not possible because the language cannot draw the meaning outside of social constructions. However, as we recently saw in our thought experiment, the meaning can be communicated, and its field of validity expands as far as the creativity of the speaker allows it. As Wittgenstein would put it: ‘Once you know what the word stands for, you understand it, you know its whole use.’ (Wittgenstein, PI #264)

The next chapter will address the issue relating knowledge and private sensations. We will see if qualia can be known, and what that could mean – to know one’s private sensation.

### Do we really know our qualia?

Many philosophers of mind are prone to tackle Cartesian Dualism. On this battlefield we are introduced with the notorious private sensations and public objects. While public objects are present and transparent for everyone to witness, private sensations are reserved only for the introspective view. Namely, the belief in introspective content is reflected in the fact that we cannot be mistaken about private sensations, because we are directly aware of them. Furthermore, public objects are not directly available to our knowledge, and therefore mistakes are possible to occur when we try to obtain its content.

For now, we will entertain ourselves with the private sensation, namely qualia, through a few ontological dogmas. The first dogma states that private sensations are *only known* by the person within the narrow limits of subjective experience. We are the only ones who know ‘what it is like’ (Nagel, 1979) to be or to feel something. In that respect, the direct sensations we experience are authentic and private, as we are the only ones who have the access to them. The usual and most common form to express such attitude is: ‘I know that I feel pain.’ Here, we will try to explain how ontological denotation of qualia can mislead us while we observe the issue from the epistemological standpoint.

The problem which arises here is an epistemological one. Namely, we are quite suspicious towards the concept of *knowing* in the aforementioned context. What kind of knowledge can we get if we are to ‘look deep inside’ about external phenomena? In contrast to this question, Frank Jackson proposed the famous knowledge argument *Mary’s room* (Jackson, 1982), in which he tends to prove how physicalism is false since there are certain types of *subjective* facts which cannot be attained through the scientific objective method. Jackson thinks that just because subjective qualities cannot be deduced from objective facts means that subjective knowledge

<sup>1</sup> Wittgenstein claims that for the new words to appear there must be some kind of language background from which new words will rise. (PI #257)

is epiphenomenal. Later on, in his paper *Mind and Illusion*, Jackson abandons epiphenomenalism on behalf of representationalism and intentional models: ‘In the same way, standing in a certain direct-awareness relationship to a mental item with such and such properties says nothing, represents nothing per se, about how the world is.’ (Jackson, 2003)

We would agree with Jackson on this point and ask ourselves if we are actually in possession of real knowledge by representation of our perceptions. Or, can we say with certainty that qualia are knowledge in philosophical or scientific way? However, the most important question can be asked if we change our perspective: ‘Is not this just another language game?’ Wittgenstein would probably affirm the last question in matter. The term *knowing* is, in our opinion, multi-dimensional, yet it has its limits. For this reason, we should check on Wittgenstein where he argues about the problem of *knowing* the private sensations:

In what sense are my sensations private? —Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. —In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word ‘to know’ as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain. — Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself I—It cannot be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.

The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself. (PI. #246)

Knowledge, therefore, implies *doubt*. The sentence ‘I doubt that I feel pain’, is by all means nonsensical and can be transformed into: ‘I know that I feel pain, but I doubt it’. Furthermore, it would be difficult to communicate this ‘knowledge of pain’ with others. Surely, others can recognize the behavior we express while being in pain, but the ‘knowledge of feeling’ itself cannot be transferred, simply because *it is not knowledge* in the strict meaning of the word. In this case we can only refer to *certainty*. Someone could raise a question addressing the aforementioned designation of knowledge by simply referring to the question on how doubtable mathematical simple truths like  $1+1=2$  are. Those kinds of questions miss the point. When we are thinking about the knowledge of our own impressions (assuming there is such a thing), we imply some kind of quality which is reserved and present to ourselves – in other words, ‘we are the sole pivot and source of this feeling’. As the sole introspective perceivers, we feel *certainty* of inner process when we say ‘I feel pain in my back’; and it seems unlikely to simultaneously deny this condition through doubt.<sup>2</sup> However, mathematical truths are not impressions’ and their

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<sup>2</sup> On difference between knowledge and certainty Wittgenstein argues in his work “On Certainty” which was composed in the eighteen months preceding his death. For additional information, see: Wittgenstein, 1969.

source is not a private room of someone's mind. This kind of reasoning is probably the highest pitch of the nonsensical which traditional metaphysics, following from Descartes and division between private and public, can deliver. As Wittgenstein asserts in *On Certainty*:

Knowledge in mathematics: Here one has to keep on reminding oneself of the unimportance of the 'inner process' or 'state' and ask 'Why should it be important? What does it matter to me?' What is interesting is how we use mathematical propositions. (Wittgenstein, *On Certainty* #38)

Qualia are understood as some kind of *labels* (secondary and singular properties like the smell of a coffee, feeling of color, taste of an apple, etc.) which are inseparable from subjective experience. While experiencing the specific sensation the feeling itself is presented to us in an unreflective manner. The body is the raw or primal *reference* in this case. We call these sensations 'mine' reflectively; and only if we are able to objectify it through establishment of subject-object relation which is only possible to form in language. When babies are making faces while tasting something sour, they are not objectifying their feelings but rather responding to something. A mere raw response to the stimuli is not the same as objectifying and communicating a feeling through language.

Just because the relationship between stimuli and response projects certain kind of information to the body, it is not enough to call such information knowledge. Therefore, qualia fail to be classified as a kind of subjective knowledge of inner states respectively, which means they are, indeed, hollow in an epistemic sense.

### Refutation of substantiality of qualia

We have shown that qualia are epistemologically hollow. Certainly, we will not claim that qualia do not provide us with information, but information in the sense of stimuli (external or internal) is far away from being considered as subjective *knowledge*. In this paragraph we will have to explore the ontological nature of qualia, in order to understand why it is necessary to abandon the view in which qualia are understood as individual and estranged substances. In that case, we might be able to associate qualia more intimately to the language and experiential context where it, as we believe, truly belongs.

When faced with the problem of qualia and their ontological place, we often get confused and baffled because of characteristics which we ascribe to them *a priori*. Qualia are unique and in all respects different to the rest of the universe. They represent specific mental contents which are housed in the ontologically designated subjectivity. This intuition is driven by fuel known as subject-object distinction, where qualia are recognized as something subjective while everything else is apodictically objective. It is a logical statement based on contradiction – objective is everything that is not 'I'.

Such intuition had moved many philosophers to make certain conclusions

on ineffable and elusive qualia. Some of them prophetically say that the time will come when we will understand the nature of this subjective phantoms hiding from the objective eye of scientific method (Nagel, 1986). Be it as it is, we assume this approach as unsatisfying. The new method will not simply 'emerge' from the current scientific research. If qualia are ontologically different from the rest of the being, then all our 'waiting' for scientific explanation is for naught. Therefore, we must be able to take a different approach to this problem, and to address this question on different grounds. Still, the way we usually – some might say naturally – conceptualize qualia has very difficult metaphysical odor. Tacit metaphysical context in which qualia are understood stems from Cartesian dualism, yet in contemporary philosophy this inquiry has taken a different form. Nowadays, philosophers of mind do not approve of two substances (*material* and *immaterial*), mostly because of lack of scientific need for non-material substance in order to explain natural phenomena. Namely, proposing a non-material substance would only make the problem unbearable to handle. (Armstrong, 1968, p. 49-53) Furthermore, while relying on science, its methods and results, we approve of matter as the only substance. Therefore, most of contemporary philosophers of mind are materialists in terms of metaphysical beliefs.

Still, the dualism survived in its epistemological and ontological form. The most significant problem which supports dualistic theories is *incompatibility* of the first-person point of view with the objective-scientific one. It seems that experience followed by consciousness is something that prevents us from having the unified (universal) picture of the world. As a result, how can we reconcile the subjective point of view, i.e. consciousness and its contents with the objectivity of science? How can we measure it and present it objectively? This kind of problem seems to be an ontological one, however, we think that its background is linguistic. In order to prevent metaphysical difficulties, we must address the problem of qualia in a different light. The way we understand qualia depends on how we think about experience.

Firstly, we cannot deal with qualia as particular instances of experience detached from the world (as the final product of epistemological separation).<sup>3</sup> We must take back estranged subjectivity into the world and consequentially treat the experience in a more suitable way - *as interactive relation within the world formed by context and meaning*. Subject-object distinction is, therefore, not a metaphysical or ontological one, but a linguistic one. That is to say, the subject-object relationship is only possible through designation in language. Furthermore, we should emphasize a different aspect of experience which is – in the strict sense – *unaware* or *primal*.

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<sup>3</sup> Subjectivity as estranged from the world is an ontological consequence coming from epistemological dualism. As first-person experience cannot be reconciled with an objective picture of the world, it naturally leads to the separation of subjective perspective from the rest of the being. In such picture, qualia become something inexplicable and unseen from the objective standpoint. Furthermore, each instance of qualia appears as 'substance', something that can be designated only from the particular standpoint. Qualia, however, cannot be interpreted as substances, because their designation does not depend on themselves alone (qualia need external criteria such is language in order to be designated and meaningful).



This sort of experience is deeply rooted in a pre-personal relation of our bodies and surroundings. In a word, primality goes beyond *the feeling of subjectivity*. Certainly, at this point we will address the conscious experience and its relationship with the language. Such attitude is inspired by William James, especially by his essay: *Does 'Consciousness' Exist*, in which James argues against the foundations of transcendentalism (especially Neo-Kantians), and advocates for pure-experience which is only possible if subjectivity and objectivity, as worldly events, are thought as inseparable. (James, 1912) For that reason, we will address the nature of qualia in everyday experience, which implies interactions – between individuals – shaped by context.

We can experience the same thing differently under the various circumstances and angles. Those circumstances are nothing more than experience shaped by external processes. Experience is not, in our terms, some product of synthetic powers of mind. Instead, we think of *experience as dispersive and elusive if not directed and organized*. That is to say, we are able to focus our attention on particular instances in order to maintain (or form) the picture in front of us. Therefore, when we think<sup>4</sup> about our qualia (instances) in everyday life our attention is directed at specific feeling or *it*. It is crucial to underline that the specific feeling in question is not isolated by itself, trapped in some kind of white room where we can inspect it closely. Daniel Dennett also argues on the same grounds in his essay *Quining Qualia*:

What counts as the way the juice tastes to x can be distinguished, one supposes, from what is a mere accompaniment, contributory cause, or byproduct of this “central” way... The mistake is not in supposing that we can in practice ever or always perform this act of purification with certainty, but the more fundamental mistake of supposing that there is such a residual property to take seriously, however uncertain our actual attempts at isolation of instances might be. (Dennett, 1990)

However, we will not argue like Dennett that qualia do not exist: on the contrary, we believe qualia are phenomenal contents of everyday experience. Be as it may, we argue that these contents are not composed out of ‘instances’ in terms of substances which can be observed (as is shown in the last paragraph) separately *as they are*. We hold that experience (in its direct sense) represents the constant flow of stimuli with the different degree of impact. Therefore, qualia are not some kind of static isolated properties of consciousness which can be observed directly in their true or pure form. In that respect qualia are not objective even for the bearer, since they cannot be objectified as such.

### Pre-personal and personal experience

We understand experience as a concrete notion which holistically binds consciousness, qualia, and language within itself. In a word, experience is a primal

<sup>4</sup> In a way, we can say that thinking about one’s qualia is not possible at all. In that respect, we can ask a question: ‘Why do I feel so much pain’ referring to the intensity of a feeling; however, we are able to perform such action (asking a question) only because we are familiar with the concepts and notions which dwell in intersubjective language and meaning, and not because qualia as such can provide us with the semantic content.

starting point, a place of interaction between a body and environment. Following from the development of physical structure of our body, our experience – the way we can perceive the world – is simultaneously developing. Out of this gradual development the consciousness is born. Therefore, in phenomenological terms, the experience can be divided into two: *pre-personal*, unreflected, and *personal* or reflected experience. The common pair can also be thought of as awareness and consciousness, but with a slight difference. Namely, awareness is mostly thought of as a kind of focused or active mental state; being aware is, therefore, a kind of attentive action. In contrast, pre-personal experience is a broader term, since it also covers those states where body or organism is passive or auto-piloted (unintentional). Peripheral and unaware contents of our experience should not be overlooked in this situation, since they certainly belong to the pre-personal experience. The fact that peripheral stimuli are not fully bound by attention does not mean they can be excluded from the holistic experience. Personal active experience and consciousness are, on the other hand, mostly the same, since we hold that intentionality of consciousness is further developed and enriched in language.<sup>5</sup> We need to note that these two modes of experiences are mostly intertwined and we should think of them in holistic terms. In this experiential bond between pre-personal and personal experience, we will be able to explore possible interactions between language and qualia.

As we have mentioned before qualia are not substances nor do they hold the epistemological quality. However, we have opposed the assertion about their non-existence as well. In order to affirm qualia, we must think of it differently, as we should abandon the ontological grounds in favour of phenomenology.

Qualia lie in domain of pre-personal and pre-contextual experience as they are non-reflective, but perceptive. This entails the liquidity of their function as an input-output series of stimuli and responses. We could say that every organism capable of environmental interaction is capable of having qualia. The term signifies nothing but the flow of sensations which drive the organism to respond to a certain circumstance. Speaking in phenomenological terms, qualia are to be found as sensational flowing information. That is to say, they are not singular properties which can be observed, nor they are individual as such. Qualia cannot be observed intellectually, since they lack the possibility to become objectified. For example, if we want to think about the pain we felt five minutes ago, we are not observing or thinking about qualia, instead we are focused on objectified manifestation which is the product of consciousness. Such understanding of qualia naturally leads us to adopt the thesis that qualia lie in the domain of unreflective pre-personal experience as the flow of information.

On the other hand, we deal with conscious reflective experience. The most

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<sup>5</sup> For example, we can express hope towards some event as an intentional state because we are familiar with the temporality as an object. In language, concept of temporality can be expressed in many ways.



specific trait of reflective experience is the ability to reflect and objectify the world providing the concrete content. Such experience is always followed by consciousness which role can be described as heuristic and creative. In this medium the distinction between *subjective* and *objective* is made. Pre-personal consciousness lacks this ability. This stadium of personal experience allows subjectivity to emerge as something opposite to objectivity while building a meaningful connection. While objectifying a phenomenon, subjectivity or active consciousness is intellectually aware of its actions, therefore; subjectivity is not simply a *feeling* (that 'I' am something), but a cognitive action towards the world and oneself. Such activity is delicate, because it deluded many thinkers into postulating an ontological or transcendental subjectivity. However, what we can see, actually, is a deep abstraction of one-sided experience, whose functions seem as an *a priori* postulate. One could argue how described subjectivity is ontological because of its universality, but then we are ought to focus our attention on the pre-personal or pure<sup>6</sup> experience in order to point out the emergence zone of subjectivity. If subject-object relationship is an activity of personal consciousness, the question is how this relationship is created in the first place if it is not based on ontology. Our hypothesis asserts that subject-object relations of active consciousness are based and formed in language.

Reflective conscious experience functions through duality of subjective-objective relations. The effort to comprehend these relations, namely to act, is conditioned by meaning which we, to some degree, absorb through language externally. In order for something to appear as an object for active consciousness, the consciousness itself must be able to establish the relation. If consciousness fails to do so, the object in front of it becomes an incomprehensible pile of data. However, consciousness as heuristic and creative act is able to modify the elements of the given empirical language in order to create a meaningful bond between itself and the object. Therefore, such activity can explain how meaning is absorbed through language, but also created by the conscious action. Now, we will explore how qualia and language interact, since – as we have already seen – they belong to different modes of conscious experience, that is, pre-personal and personal respectively.

If we assume that I feel pain right now, then I am aware of it. This feeling is in the middle of the picture of my present being; my attention is focused on it, as my consciousness is rearranging the stimuli accordingly. If I am not familiar with the word 'pain', I would not have been able to express my condition in a meaningful way (I would not be able to establish the connection towards the object) by saying: 'Pass me those pills, I feel pain.' Instead, I would most likely shout, yell, express my condition in other behavioral way as small children do. If a doctor asked me 'How do you feel?', how could I possibly reply? In this scenario, my qualia lie *outside of the context and language* unable to become *detected* even though they are *here* in a form of *pre-personal certainty*.

<sup>6</sup> An idea of pre-personal experience is influenced by William James notion of pure experience. For further reading see: A World of Pure Experience in (James, 1912).

Without language, a meaning cannot be established, which leaves our qualia – *at their basic state* – obscure and meaningfully inexpressible. It is not the case that qualia are intrinsically ineffable, instead they are ineffable because they are meaningless themselves; so to speak, they still belong to the pre-personal field of experience. In order to break down this hiatus (between ineffability and expression!), we need to establish a meaningful relation between pre-personal certainty and personal consciousness. Consciousness does it with the help of language by providing the grounds for objectification. This is why we can establish meaningful connections by stating: ‘It hurts a lot’ or ‘It’s more like itching.’ Finally, we can say that our consciousness, even if it is a part of personal reflective experience, is a main bridge of connection between our inner-state qualia and the world of language and meaning. Now, we have to address, shortly, the relationship between language and consciousness.

For our thought experiment we will, for the sake of explanation, focus on the linguistic experience of *time* as it would be experienced by two-year-old child. We have chosen this example because toddlers have not developed a fully active personal consciousness and, thereby, their experiential content is different from that of a grown individual. Certainly, there cannot be any ‘feeling’ of time as ‘feeling of tomorrow’ or ‘feeling of five days ago’, because in this case time is projected and immersed in language as an object – it is an abstract concept. Young children are not familiar with complex concepts of time such as: tomorrow, next week, in five hours, yesterday, etc, as their awareness is confined in the present moment in a form of pre-personal experience. At the current stage, they simply cannot understand statements like: ‘We will go outside on Friday’, ‘What did we do yesterday?’, ‘Next Sunday will be sunny’. Further development of consciousness is dependent on brain development, which is the first milestone for establishing meaning through language. Development of consciousness of a child is fully dependent on the development of language; since this is a place where meaning and objectification of time can happen. We cannot objectify the time if we are not able to develop time-spatial abstractions. Therefore, if consciousness is subordinated to physical development of a body and semantics of language which is a part of it, then young children are not capable of disposing of meaning. As a result, their consciousness cannot have a wider range of operations. Thus, the functionality of consciousness would essentially depend on the meaning which is intrinsic to language.

### Conclusion: Consciousness as a bridge

At the beginning of this paper we proposed *via negativa* arguments on account of the nature of qualia. Firstly, we have concluded that qualia cannot carry any epistemological significance, instead they belong to the field of being which we – under Wittgenstein’s influence – signified as certainty. Certainty, in this manner, is nothing else but a direct sense of stimuli – a presence of raw momentary feelings. If qualia fall under this kind of private certainty, then the possibility of some kind

of subjective knowledge cannot be affirmed, since knowledge itself implies doubt which is to be found in intersubjective modus of experience. Secondly, we opposed the so called ontology of qualia, which states that qualia are some kind of properties. Ontology of qualia is the product of pre-established duality of subject-object relationship. Just because ‘it feels to be like something’ it seemed necessary to build up a realm (mind) where certain properties dwell as irreducible properties. These qualitative particulars have their own distinctive features which all can be subsumed under the term – isolation. Such ontological situation only prolongs and further complicates the problem of the nature of qualia. As Wittgenstein signified, we cannot create a private language which would correspond to our qualia; namely, qualia themselves are silent and cannot be spoken out in a meaningful way; the word ‘pain’ is not the same as the feeling of pain, however, it does stand for something, it describes a certain event or behavior. Such argument led to the assumption that qualia and language are somehow connected or intertwined.

In order to understand qualia and their relationship with the language, we needed to provide an explanation independently of physicalism (such is Dennett’s). Explanation from physicalism does not satisfy us, since the final product of its argumentative track leads to the denying the existence of qualia. Our method can be described as phenomenological and empirical, and as such affirms the existence of qualia, however in a different way.

We have proposed a phenomenological investigation of experience, because we believe that the bond of qualia and language can be tracked in it. Looking at the experience in its pure form, we stated that it is a synthesis of inner life of a body and the environmental factors in a broader sense (biological, psychological, social, etc.), which means it must be understood in holistic terms. Following from the holistic view, the analysis has shown that two modes of experience can be constituted: pre-personal and personal experience. The first kind of experience is described as undifferentiated and primal, or unreflective. We have said that qualia dwell on this kind of pre-personal level of being as constant flow of information in a form of stimuli-response navigation. In this sense, qualia do not carry any particular *meaning* or structure which would allow them to become expressible. However, there are primitive ways to express stimuli through a response (the way screams are an expression of pain), but this kind of expression is not a meaningful one; namely, on this stage of experience we do not have an established subject-object relationship because consciousness is not an active function, and therefore we cannot think of qualia as ‘subjective’ instances of experience<sup>7</sup>, as they are described often by some philosophers of mind.

The second mode of experience is needed to establish a connection, and we have designated it as personal-experience. Personal experience, contrasted against pre-personal experience, is active, heuristic, and creative, and therefore we can say its core is focused on consciousness dealing with abstractions. In this mode of

<sup>7</sup> Simply because there is no such thing as subject at this level of experience.

experience, consciousness is an act which establishes subject-object relations, which are built in language and meaning. In a word, consciousness is able to create a bond between self and the *other* by objectifying this relationship, and objectification is nothing more than the *infusion of meaning* through language, without which the subject-object relation would disintegrate.

Qualia as a part of pre-personal experience or passive awareness are therefore meaningfully silent and obscure. Yet, consciousness is able to connect these two forms of experience due to their reflective nature. Consciousness, therefore, acts as a bridge between personal and pre-personal (primal) experience as it brings qualia closer to our attention. Once we try to objectify qualia in language by transporting them from the pre-personal, that is, primal, to the personal sphere, we, then, deal with the meaningful concept such as ‘pain’, while the vitality of the feeling is left behind in the field of certainty.

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## Kvalije, (privatni) jezik i iskustvo

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Svrha ovog rada se sastoji u analizi odnosa kvalija i jezika. Autor će započeti sa objašnjenjem prirode kvalija negativnom metodom (drugo i treće poglavlje), kojom će se pokazati da kvalije ne poseduju ontološka svojstva u tradicionalnom smislu, niti kao takve ima bilo kakvu epistemološku vrednost. U četvrtom poglavlju, kvalije ćemo suočiti sa jezikom na osnovu fenomenološkog iskustva koje shvatamo kao holističko. Iskustvo kao takvo nije diferencirano, što znači da ono ne sadrži odnos subjekta i objekta u ontološkom smislu. Fenomenološki analizirano, iskustvo će biti prikazano na dva načina: prepersonalno i personalno. Prepersonalno iskustvo kao nereflektovano ne može proizvesti subjekt-objekt odnos, i kao takvo predstavlja rodno mesto kvalija kao strukture podsticaja i reakcije. S druge strane, mogućnost personalnog iskustva zavisi jedino od svesti. Svest je aktivna funkcija iskustva koja proizvodi odnos subjekta i objekta, objekcijom

odnosa između sebe i drugog. Takva objeacija je moguća samo u granicama jezika koji je konstituisan kao veza značenja; što će reći da bez značenja uopšte nema ni predmeta. Konačni zaključak rada odnosi se na uspostavljanje veze između kvalija i jezika (prepersonalnog i personalnog), koju čini svest.

**Ključne riječi:**

iskustvo, jezik, kvalija, personalni, prepersonalni.

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